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Abstract
People with dementia sometimes confabulate, offering sincere explanations of their situation which are not grounded in 
evidence. Similar explanation-giving behaviour occurs frequently in the non-clinical population. Some see this as evidence 
that clinical and non-clinical confabulations emanate from the same essential feature of cognition, a drive to provide causal 
theories (Coltheart in Cortex 87:62–68, 2017). Others maintain that clinical confabulations are not attempts to identify 
causal relations, but narratives which create and emphasise socially important meanings (Örulv and Hydén in Discourse Stud 
8(5):647–673, 2006). We can reconcile these accounts, preserving the explanatory appealing features of both. I argue that 
humans have a tendency to imbue everyday explanations with resonant themes: ideas which strike a chord with us and render 
our experiences meaningful, and I explain how this is compatible with the drive to provide causal theories. Explanation-giving 
is a communicative, inherently social practice, and so it is not only shaped by the advantages it confers in the natural world; 
but also by the advantages it confers in the social world, and for related psychological functioning. As such, confabulation 
is an attempt to emphasise socially resonant themes, whilst also being continuous with everyday explanation giving.
Keywords Confabulation · Explanation · Narrative · Resonance · Dementia
1 Introduction
People with dementia sometimes confabulate, offering sin-
cere, non-deceitful explanations of their situation which are 
not grounded in evidence, and which are often interpreted 
as part of the cognitive decline of the disease. However, 
sincere explanations not grounded in evidence also occur 
in a variety of non-clinical contexts (Nisbett and Wilson 
1977, Cohen 2003). Max Coltheart has recently proposed 
an account (2017) which unifies clinical and non-clinical 
instances of confabulation, seeing them emanate from the 
same essential feature of cognition: a drive to explain which 
generates attempts to provide veridical causal theories, mod-
elled on Alison Gopnik’s notion of the theory formation sys-
tem (henceforth; TFS) (2000). On this account, confabu-
lation in all populations is the normal output of the TFS, 
an attempt to provide a veridical causal theory to explain a 
perplexing situation, which is unsuccessful.
Other authors who study confabulation in clinical popula-
tions have focused on a different aspect of the phenomenon. 
Conway and Tacchi (1996) investigate the confabulations of 
a person with a traumatic brain injury, while Linda Örulv 
and Lars-Christer Hydén (2006) examine confabulation in 
dementia patients, and stress the narrative features of con-
fabulation. They maintain that confabulations seen in these 
contexts are not attempts to identify causal relations, but 
narratives which create and emphasise socially important 
meanings.
How do these accounts fit together? Is non-clinical con-
fabulation ever an attempt to create social important mean-
ing? And can confabulations that play this role also be the 
output of the TFS? In this paper, I argue that we can recon-
cile these accounts, preserving the explanatory appealing 
features of both. Örulv and Hydén (2006) provide a power-
ful analysis which both explains and predicts the particu-
lar character of clinical confabulations, but I suggest that 
they identify a feature of explanation-giving which is in fact 
widespread in the non-clinical population as well. I argue 
that humans have a tendency to imbue everyday explanations 
with resonant themes: ideas which strike a chord with us and 
render our experiences meaningful, and I explain how this 
is compatible with the operation of the TFS. Explanation-
giving is a communicative, inherently social practice, and 
so it is not only shaped by the advantages it confers in the 
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natural world (namely, providing veridical causal maps); but 
also by the advantages it confers in the social world, and for 
related psychological functioning. As such, confabulation 
can be seen as an attempt to emphasise socially resonant 
themes, whilst also being continuous with everyday expla-
nation giving.
This result is of interest from a theoretical point of view, 
because it proposes a new account of explanation, extending 
the explanatory power of Gopnik’s theory, enabling us to 
explain why, so often, people do not make use of veridical 
causal explanations. But further, an account which demon-
strates that confabulation in clinical contexts is continuous 
with everyday explanation-giving behaviour is important 
and valuable for reducing the considerable stigma attached 
to mental illness, and in particular, dementia. I close by out-
lining some potential avenues for future research, namely, 
investigating whether there is a robust effect of using reso-
nant narratives to facilitate the retention of otherwise dispa-
rate items in experience.
2  Examples of Confabulation
Let us begin by looking at some events recorded by Örulv 
and Hydén (2006). I paraphrase two different perspectives 
on these events, starting with that of Martha, who is hosting 
guests in her living room:
LISCENCE (Martha): Seated on the living room sofas, 
host Martha turns to one of her guests, Catherine, and 
informs her that the TV belongs to her, and further-
more, that she pays for the licence.
COFFEE (Martha): Martha offers to serve her guests 
coffee. She makes to pour the coffee, but then estab-
lishes that everyone has had coffee already, so there is 
actually no need.
 At least, this is how Martha understands the unfolding 
events. But further information reveals that something is 
up. Martha and Catherine have been diagnosed with Alz-
heimer’s disease, and these events in fact take place in their 
care home, where Örulv and Hydén are conducting an eth-
nographic study. Drawing on other contextual clues from 
their 6-months observation, Örulv and Hydén have a differ-
ent understanding of the situation:
LISCENCE (ÖH): Martha has (erroneously) come to 
believe that she is hosting guests in her own home. 
She is perplexed by the TV. She would never watch a 
TV without paying for the licence, but she is able to 
explain away the perplexity of the situation by con-
cluding that the TV must belong to her, and that she 
pays the licence after all.
COFFEE (ÖH): Martha offers to serve her guests cof-
fee, but when she makes to pour the coffee, she is una-
ble to operate the unfamiliar coffee pot (which belongs 
to the care home). She is perplexed that she is unable 
to serve her guests, but is able to explain away the per-
plexity by establishing that everyone has already had 
coffee, and so there is no need for her to serve them.1
 According to Örulv and Hydén, when Martha explains that 
the TV is hers, and that everyone has had coffee, she is con-
fabulating. That is, she is offering a sincere account of what 
she takes to be that facts of the situation, but her account is 
not grounded in evidence, and doesn’t accurately reflect the 
situation.
Many have argued that confabulation is the result of dis-
ruption to memory processes occurring in cognitive pathol-
ogy (Berlyne 1972; Moscovitch 1989). However, people 
with no known pathologies can exhibit similar behaviour, 
offering sincere accounts of a situation, which are not 
grounded in evidence. For instance, Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977) demonstrate that people tend to choose the item on 
the right-most side of an array of broadly similar clothes, 
even when the order of the clothes is randomised. When 
people explain their choices, they do not cite the position of 
the item, referring instead to factors like the colour or the 
fabric quality. Because we see the position effect emerge 
despite randomisation, Nisbett and Wilson argue that the 
reasons given by participants are not based on considerations 
which moved them at the time of decision, yet these reasons 
are sincerely given. In another study Cohen (2003) provided 
participants with one political party’s welfare policies, but 
framed them to look as if they were policies of a party on 
the other side of the political spectrum, then asked people 
whether they supported the policies. People tended to sup-
port policies framed as of their preferred party (thus actually 
supporting policies of the opposing party), but claimed that 
they made their choices, guided by their own philosophy of 
governance, on the basis of the policies’ content.
Further to explanations about past choices, other studies 
demonstrate that a similar effect can occur when participants 
attempt to make sense of current, unfolding experiences. 
For instance, Barnier et al. (2010; in Coltheart 2017) dem-
onstrate that healthy participants may be hypnotised with 
the suggestion that they will see a stranger in the mirror. 
When participants see their own reflection, they explain that 
there must be a room on the other side of the mirror, or 
that the experimenters have found someone who looks like 
them. Hirstein (2006, pp. 13–14) also reports on a case in 
1 Örulv and Hydén reach these interpretations of Martha’s situation 
through compiling contextual clues from a number of episodes dur-
ing their many months of observation, as will be discussed further in 
Sect. 4.
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which a person is hypnotised with the suggestion to lift their 
arm when they hear the word ‘money’. When they hear the 
word and raise their arm, they explain that they just felt like 
stretching.
In the above studies in which people explain a previous 
choice they made, a factor other than that identified in the 
participants’ explanations drives choices, and so explana-
tions are not grounded in evidence of what actually brought 
about choices. But they are nonetheless sincerely given.2 In 
the hypnosis studies, people do not recognise that hypnotic 
suggestion prevents them from accessing an accurate expla-
nation of their ongoing experience, but this does not prevent 
them from trying to make sense of what they are presently 
seeing or doing. So, behaviour similar to that just discussed 
in the context of Alzheimer’s can also occur without patho-
logical memory deficit.
Recognition of this has led some to argue that the cases 
above and memory pathology cases share sufficiently many 
features so as to be addressed together (Hirstein 2006; Bor-
tolotti and Cox 2009; Coltheart 2017; Bortolotti 2018). For 
instance, Lisa Bortolotti and Rochelle Cox (2009), distin-
guish “narrow” approaches to confabulation, which make 
reference to cognitive pathology that accompanies confabu-
lation in clinical contexts, from “broad” approaches which 
draw attention to the epistemic and functional features 
common in both the clinical and non-clinical cases just dis-
cussed, namely that they are sincerely given accounts which 
are not grounded in evidence.3 Recently, Coltheart (2017) 
has provided a compelling defence of the notion that there 
is a broader phenomenon of confabulation in play in both 
clinical and non-clinical contexts, which we’ll explore in 
more depth in the next section.
3  Confabulation as (Attempted) Causal 
Explanation
In the spirit of the “broad” understanding of confabulation, 
Coltheart (2017) has recently offered a new theory that uni-
fies clinical and non-clinical instances, seeing them emanate 
from the same essential feature of cognition. Conversational 
context requires the individual to explain why they have 
behaved in the way they just did. In these cases, either an 
experimental confederate or a clinician asks the individual 
for an explanation. According to Coltheart, these individuals 
are unable to offer true explanations, because in each case, 
there is no answer to the question (2017, p. 66). One might 
contend that this isn’t strictly true, for individuals do not act 
at random. For instance, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) suggest 
that participants choose because of a position effect, which 
is surely one possible answer to the question of why they 
acted. But interlocutors usually want to hear a particular sort 
of answer, an answer in which we explain that the choice 
was brought about by our recognition that the chosen option 
was superior to others, thus justifying the choice. So, I think 
we can read Coltheart as meaning that there is no answer 
which both justifies the choice and explains how the choice 
came about. Nonetheless, explanations are given sincerely 
(2017, p. 66).4
Drawing on work by Gopnik (2000), Coltheart maintains 
that there is a general property of human cognition, which 
he calls “the drive for causal understanding”, which leads us 
to readily come up with explanations of why things happen, 
even when our explanations are not grounded in evidence 
and fail to identify the relevant causes. Recall that Gopnik 
argues that humans have a special representation system, 
the TFS. In her exposition of the TFS, Gopnik makes an 
analogy with the visual representation system, which trans-
forms retinal input into representations of objects moving 
through space. The TFS operates one level up, drawing on 
information from all perceptual systems, transforming it into 
causal maps, understood as “abstract, coherent, defeasible 
2 For other examples of confabulation in the non-clinical popula-
tion, Brasil-Neto et al. (1992), Uhlmann & Cohen (2007), Hall et al. 
(2012), and Johansson et al. (2005).
3 Falsity, rather than an inappropriate relation to evidence, is often 
identified as the key epistemic characteristic of confabulation (e.g. 
Örulv and Hydén 2006). But we ought to make room for the possibil-
ity of confabulation which does not have the appropriate relation to 
evidence, yet happens to be true (see footnote 6 for an example). I fol-
low others (Bortolotti and Cox 2009; Hirstein 2006; Bortolotti 2018) 
in identifying confabulation as not grounded in evidence. One might 
think that there is a sense in which almost all explanations are 
grounded in evidence, in so far as they are given on the basis of an 
inference from experience. However, I also follow others (ibid) in 
speaking of an explanation of a choice that is “grounded in evidence” 
to mean an explanation that identifies the processes relevant to why 
that choice was made.
4 Coltheart’s focus here is confabulation that is provoked by a ques-
tion directed at the confabulator, where the confabulation functions 
to provide an answer. By contrast, Martha’s confabulations were not 
provoked by questioning, but occur spontaneously. Originally pro-
posed by Berlyne (1972) the provoked/spontaneous distinction is 
clinically significant, with provoked and spontaneous confabulations 
varying across diagnoses (e.g. Nahum et al. 2012). But both display 
the fundamental features of the “broad” understanding of confabula-
tion (given sincerely; but not grounded in evidence). Further, Mar-
tha’s confabulations are not spontaneous in the ordinary understand-
ing of the word, because they serve as answers to situations which 
Martha perceives to be perplexing, and which she desires to resolve. 
So, I will consider both standardly provoked confabulation, and con-
fabulation such as Martha’s which is spontaneously produced, but not 
random, because it occurs when the confabulator perceives some fea-
ture of their environment in need of explanation.
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representations of the causal structure of the world” (Gopnik 
2000, p. 300). For Gopnik, a species that can model causal 
relations between entities has an evolutionary advantage 
over one that models only spatial information, the former 
being more successful at navigating, predicting and exploit-
ing their environments, ultimately facilitating the achieve-
ment of goals related to survival, and increasing the likeli-
hood they will successfully reproduce (2000, p. 309).
Crucial to the proposal is the distinctive phenomenol-
ogy of explanation-giving: the satisfaction we feel when 
we experience what Gopnik calls the “aha!” moment of 
explanation, when we take ourselves to have identified the 
relevant causal relations and perplexity is diffused (2000, 
p. 310): The satisfaction we experience when we produce 
explanations motivates us to keep coming up with them 
(analogously to the way that orgasm motivates creatures who 
experience it to have sex and reproduce), so that the TFS is 
in frequent use, and cognition is well stocked with causal 
maps of our environment.
What about bad explanations, those that do not have the 
appropriate relationship to the evidence, which result in non-
veridical causal maps? For Gopnik, whilst the TFS aims at 
producing veridical causal maps, it is not guaranteed to do 
this, and might often misidentify causes. Analgously, the 
visual system often produces non-veridical representations 
(e.g. illusions, hallucinations), but this does not under-
mine that the selected-for function of the visual system is 
to produce veridical representations. Likewise, the fact that 
the TFS often produces what Gopnik calls “normatively 
deficient” explanations, resulting in non-veridical causal 
maps, does not undermine that its selected-for function is to 
produce well-grounded explanations, which get the causal 
structure of the world broadly right (Gopnik 2000, p. 314).5 
Bad explanations merely demonstrate that the TFS does not 
function as it should on some occasions.
According to Coltheart, when people confabulate (in both 
clinical and non-clinical contexts), the TFS is operating, and 
they are motivated to achieve that same feeling of the satis-
faction of explanation which drives all explanation-giving 
behaviour. Coltheart maintains that clinical confabulations 
are “cognitively normal responses to cognitively abnormal 
situations” (2017, p. 68). Thus, even in when they occur in 
clinical cases alongside cognitive deficits, confabulations 
fall within the spectrum of normal human behaviour.
This is unlike previous accounts which stress the narra-
tive features of confabulation, which we’ll now explore in 
more depth before examining whether they are consistent 
with one another.
4  Confabulation as Narrative
Örulv and Hydén criticise past work on confabulation for 
concentrating on pathology and cognitive deficit (2006, p. 
649). Focusing on cases in dementia, they identify what they 
call some “productive” (beneficial) aspects of confabulation 
which are not yet identified or incorporated into Coltheart’s 
proposal. Specifically, they argue that confabulation scholars 
should recruit “a contextualized description of confabulation 
in order to understand it as a social and discursive phenom-
enon with productive features and certain functions rather 
than merely as a physiological and cognitive phenomenon” 
(ibid). Their proposal is that confabulations are discursive 
events with distinctive narrative features, the aim of which 
is not simply to provide a plausible causal explanation, but 
to impose meaning on otherwise perplexing experiences. 
Of course, almost all communicative acts have meaning of 
some sort, but Örulv and Hydén seem to have something 
more specific in mind: personally and socially significant 
meanings which link to the identity and life-history of the 
confabulator.
We can revisit their example of Martha to see this in 
context. Örulv and Hydén reach their understanding of 
Martha’s situation as described in LISCENCE and COF-
FEE from Sect. 2 by drawing on further clues from Martha’s 
conversations with other residents. Martha makes numerous 
attempts to offer many other residents (and their families) 
coffee besides Catherine; she is confused as to why there is a 
card addressed to another woman on the table; she is baffled 
when the nurses do not ask for her permission before using 
the lavatory. Örulv and Hydén also identify several reminis-
cent conversations in which Martha tells other residents how 
she had taken pride in welcoming guests (particularly those 
in need) into her home, sharing food and showing hospital-
ity (2006, pp. 655–656). They conclude that in the events 
captured in LISCENCE and COFFEE, Martha has come to 
believe once again that she is the gracious hostess, as she 
genuinely had been on many occasions throughout her life, 
a role that was clearly important to her (2006, p. 655). As 
such, her confabulation in COFFEE, concluding that eve-
ryone has already been served, rather than acknowledging 
that she cannot work the unfamiliar coffee pot, allows her to 
preserve an interpretation of the situation that has important 
social meaning for her.6
6 Martha’s claim that everyone has already coffee is in fact true; prior 
to the COFFEE episode, the nurses did indeed serve everyone. But 
attending to the precise unfolding of events, Örulv and Hydén suggest 
that Martha does not arrive at this claim through appreciation of this 
evidence, because she makes the claim directly after failing to operate 
the unfamiliar coffee pot, and this, in the context of other episodes in 
which Martha acts out the hostess roll, leads to the interpretation that 
Martha’s claim is a confabulation. Note that an account which centres 
falsity as the key epistemic feature of confabulation cannot character-
ise Martha’s claim as confabulatory, and so this is a concrete exam-
5 Gopnik’s account tends to run together (epistemic) norm talk and 
biological function talk. For an explicit account of the compatibility 
of these notions, see Sullivan-Bissett (2017).
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Likewise, the confabulation in LISCENCE reflects 
another socially important theme for Martha. Örulv and 
Hydén document a number of conversations in which Mar-
tha talks of past events in which she was self-supporting 
financially, paying for things herself, whilst also saving large 
amounts to provide for her family, as people in both her 
personal and professional life took advantage of her gen-
erosity (2006, pp. 662–665). Establishing that she would 
never watch a TV without paying for the license, therefore, 
is an opportunity for Martha to call to mind and affirm these 
important aspects of her social identity.
Others have highlighted these productive features of clini-
cal confabulation. Conway and Tacchi (1996) contend that 
the content of confabulated memories often concerns issues 
of personal significance to the patient, particularly regarding 
features of their identity and relationships to others. They 
discuss the case of “OP”, a brain injury patient with post-
traumatic amnesia who confabulated elaborate stories about 
family holidays which could not have happened, but which 
served to provide support throughout the disorientating 
experience of care and treatment after the accident, during 
a time when her family in fact reduced their contact with her. 
OP’s confabulations enable her to recast negative events in 
a better light, emphasising social meanings that define her 
sense of self, enabling her to “rewrite her personal history so 
that both the remote and recent past provide support for her 
in a difficult period when little external support is present,” 
(Conway and Tacchi 1996, p. 333).
Similar considerations lead Örulv and Hydén to conclude 
that:
Confabulatory utterances such as in [LISCENCE] 
should be approached as narratives told to an audi-
ence in order to make a certain point. They should 
be seen as having a logic of their own in accordance 
with a plot and an overall storyline, rather than as 
statements about the world that are to be perceived as 
either true or false. The confabulating person’s way 
of understanding the situation is based on a narra-
tive logic rather than on a logic of true and false. It 
does not concern the world as it is, but the world as it 
makes sense—and the person acts accordingly (2006, 
pp. 669–670).
 There is some unclarity in the articulation above that 
because confabulations are narratives, they are not to be 
perceived as either true or false. Narratives are, minimally, 
(sets of) propositions about the world, and so they are at least 
truth-evaluable. So, Örulv and Hydén are more charitably 
interpreted as meaning that confabulations should not be 
understood simply as attempts to generate theories about the 
world, but instead to tell a story that imposes sense on an 
otherwise perplexing experience, achieved by emphasising 
ideas that have some special importance to the confabulator.
We have here a different perspective on confabulation to 
that provided by Coltheart (2017), and it has not yet been 
established whether confabulations which have this specific 
function, to create meaning, can still be considered the out-
put of the TFS. The TFS, recall, aims to produce veridi-
cal causal theories, an aim that is supposedly explained by 
natural selection—because a capacity to produce veridical 
causal theories confers a selective advantage. Creation of 
meaning is not yet part of the picture. But, for Örulv and 
Hydén, meaning creation is a systematic function of clinical 
confabulation, one that individual confabulations can suc-
cessfully perform, without being veridical causal maps. Are 
they produced by a system distinct from the TFS after all, 
one that functions specifically to create meaning? I turn to 
this question in the next section.
5  The Pursuit of Resonant Meaning
In the following, I suggest that sometimes—in fact, often—
the TFS produces explanations that appear to be attempts 
to supply causal theories, but which have a specific charac-
ter not yet articulated on Gopnik’s account. That is, in pre-
senting what is ostensibly a causal theory, they also aim to 
emphasise particular meanings, which often have very little 
to do with the relevant causal relations. This is not restricted 
to clinical confabulation, and nor is it an accidental quirk of 
the TFS. Whilst causal maps can serve their function in pri-
vate, explanation-giving itself is communicative, and so it is 
an inherently social practice. Explanation-giving is therefore 
not only shaped by the advantages it confers in the natural 
world (e.g. successfully modelling causal relations); but also 
by the advantages it confers in the social world.
Örulv and Hydén’s narratives are a subset of larger set of 
narratives with a particular property that I shall call reso-
nance, which we’ll now explore in detail.
5.1  Resonance
A narrative is resonant when it “strikes a chord” or “rings 
true” for the teller and audience. This is close to the idea 
of “narrative fidelity” proposed by Walter Fisher (1984), in 
which we value stories with themes that we recognise from 
our own lives, which capture some of the essence of the 
human condition. Fisher draws on the epic of Gilgamesh 
as an example of a story with narrative fidelity, which he 
claims, even at over 4000 years old, contains many ideas 
ple of why accounts which stress the importance of how the claim is 
arrived at (e.g., that it is appropriately grounded in evidence of what 
drives the relevant choice or action) should be preferred.
Footnote 6 (continued)
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and themes we recognise as relevant and important to human 
experience today (1984, p. 281). Fisher acknowledges that 
fidelity has some epistemological constraints, in so far as 
a story should not be too far from what we can imagine as 
corresponding with reality. But fidelity is also given in the 
“mythic” aspects of a narrative, by which Fisher is plausibly 
interpreted to mean how the story engages us with stirring 
but recognisable themes, as well in its promotion of moral 
norms and behaviour, which Fisher says uplifts us (1984, 
p. 280).
We will not take the notion of narrative fidelity tout court. 
It’s a common criticism of narrative fidelity that it is unable 
to account for people who find distinctly immoral narratives 
compelling—Mein Kampf has struck a chord with many, 
for example (Warnick 1987). More generally, not everyone 
finds the same stories compelling to the same extent. With 
this in mind, my proposal of how we should understand 
resonance is to take Fisher’s notion of narrative fidelity, but 
strip away the normative baggage. Resonance has the same 
phenomenological component, that feeling when a narrative 
“strikes a chord”, and elucidates meaning, but we cannot so 
neatly account for when we’ll feel it by pointing to some 
universally agreed upon set of moral principles. Instead, I 
propose an analogue to Quinean holism about verification, 
on which the resonance of any given narrative for a subject 
S is determined by its various connections to other experi-
ences and narratives that S finds resonant. Given that many 
experiences are common across the human condition, there 
is still room on this picture for many people to find many of 
the same ideas similarly resonant.
One might wonder whether resonance is just the same 
thing as Gopnik’s “aha” moment (2000), but the evocation 
conditions are different. Gopnik’s argument is that “ahas” 
happen when we aim to provide causal theories, whereas 
I am suggesting that resonance arises when we interpret 
and assign meanings, through recognition of connection to 
other ideas and experiences, regardless of whether we are 
also searching for causes. We can find fictional narratives 
resonant, even though we do not take them to be veridical 
maps of reality. We can also find narratives which present 
themselves as descriptions of reality as resonant indepen-
dently of whether they are grounded in evidence. As such, 
the experience of resonance does not always promote the 
discovery of causes. We’ll return to the precise way that this 
proposal extends Gopnik’s idea shortly.
5.2  Existing Literature and Examples
Let’s explore how the idea that we often imbue our 
descriptions and explanations of aspects of ourselves and 
the world with resonance is supported by existing research 
into narrative. A number of authors in the humanities 
argue for the centrality of narrative to interpreting past and 
current experiences. It has been argued that we consolidate 
who we are through the stories we tell about ourselves 
(Ricœur 1984–1988); and that recalling and communicat-
ing our experiences is not so much a process of introspec-
tion as it is interpretation, a chance to find meaning and 
significance in our lives. (Freeman 1993). As well as find-
ing meaning in past events, we use narratives in real-time 
to interpret unfolding experiences, to connect and situate 
ourselves in our current environment (Fisher 1985).
The idea that we use meaningful narratives as a means 
to interpret past and current events and experiences is also 
maintained through a body of empirical work in the social 
sciences (Fivush et al. 1995; Reese and Brown 2000; Neis-
ser 1988; Engel 1999). For example, Fivush et al. (1995) 
show that parents who share embellished, resonant nar-
ratives about the past facilitate their children’s ability 
to recount their own past, and argue that autobiographic 
memory itself develops in service of our recounting our 
experiences to others in this way. Cunliffe and Coupland 
(2011) demonstrate that sports teams use narratives in 
their on-pitch discourse to characterise the unfolding suc-
cesses and misfortunes of their game. For example, a “hero 
to villain to hero” narrative is recruited to redeem a player 
who scores after a second attempt. Of course, successful 
goals, tries, etc. are a combination of the player’s skill, 
and factors beyond their control (such as the trajectory 
of the ball as it is passed to the player taking the shot, the 
weather conditions and their effects on the pitch, and so 
on) but this does not necessarily prevent the team using 
narratives which focus chiefly on individuals’ characters 
to explain their fortunes in the game.
A further example comes from Poulson et al. (1979) who 
ran a study in which young children were asked to describe 
and recall a series of pictures taken from story books. In one 
condition the pictures were in their original order, with a 
clear narrative progressing throughout the sequence, whilst 
in another condition the pictures were scrambled with no 
obvious narrative. When recalling the pictures, 6-years-old 
tried to interpret the pictures as a coherent story: making 
inferences; attributing understandable thoughts, emotions 
and purposes to the characters; and using narrative conven-
tions, such as setting the scene, using temporal connectives 
between events, and resolving events. Notably, this occurred 
even in the scrambled condition in which no obvious narra-
tive was discernible. The authors say:
When the pictures were in order, they were quite suc-
cessful [at telling a story]; when the pictures were 
out of order their attempts to tell a story frequently 
failed, yet they kept trying, so that the 6-year-olds 
produced in fact more story propositions in the 
scrambled condition than in the normal condition. 
(Poulson et al. 1979, p. 392).
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One might wonder whether this study could just as easily 
be interpreted as further evidence of the standard operation 
of the TFS. Perhaps some of the descriptive behaviors the 
6-years-old exhibited could be construed as attempts to use 
causal theories as a way of interpreting events in an imagina-
tive or fictional setting, such as explaining behaviour as the 
result of particular thoughts they attributed to the characters, 
and using temporal connectives to show one event was the 
result of one that preceded it. But it’s harder to explain other 
behaviours as the provision of causal theories. For instance, 
scene setting and resolving storylines seem to have more 
to do with entertaining and engaging the audience in the 
thematic elements of the story, than simply uncovering prob-
able causes.
I propose that many everyday explanations involve reso-
nant narratives. Consider explanations of events that defer 
to there being “greater powers” at work, such as conspiracy 
theories, or explanations that invoke the operation of deities 
and other spiritual forces. Psychologists have argued that 
these sorts of explanations are attempts to impose meaning 
on experiences, to reinterpret (mis)fortune as the intentional 
work of characters and forces with particular agendas, rather 
than as the result of more mundane conditions and circum-
stantial luck (Hood et al. 2009). One example is using astro-
logical phenomena (e.g. the position of planets relative to 
points on the earth’s surface) to explain ups and downs in 
one’s life. Take Robin, for example. Last week, he lost his 
debit card, bought milk that turned out to be sour, and failed 
his driving test. Causal explanations which cite a combina-
tion of physical and psychological conditions that satisfac-
torily explain these events independently of each other are 
available. Accordingly, the rip in his wallet that he had not 
got around to repairing had been steadily widening until his 
card finally fell out; his local shop experienced an unfore-
seen delay in which stock intended for the refrigerated isle 
was left out in the sun; and he had not properly practised the 
manoeuvres required to pass the driving test, so the exam-
iner made a reasonable call failing him.
However, Robin does not attempt to uncover the causal 
relations cited in these explanations, perplexed by what he 
sees to be a string of unlucky events which cannot just be 
down to chance. In this respect, Robin is much like other 
humans: typically bad at recognizing random sequences, 
and overperceiving patterns and significant relations which 
are not really there (Gilovich et al. 1985). In this case, 
Robin turns to his horoscope for this week. It suggests that 
Aries are in for a downturn in their fortunes (the lost card, 
the sour milk) and that Aries’ natural confidence and tena-
ciousness will cause them to have a run in with level-headed 
Libras (Libras typically become examiners and judges, by 
the way). The horoscope explanation is preferable to Robin 
because it imbues the unlucky, but frankly mundane and 
unconnected events with a deeper significance, allowing 
a narrative to unfold which weaves the events together; 
emphasising not undesirable traits of his personality as cen-
tral to the story, as opposed to the more banal combination 
of an ordinary share of bad luck and a lack of effort and 
vigilance to explain the events.
Consider another example. For a recent birthday, my 
mother bought me a woollen jumper for wearing about the 
house, acknowledging that I get cold easily, which is true. 
The jumper has a series of furry tassels, which look a little 
bit like some toys I had recently bought my cats, and I joked 
that the garment was perfect, because it was like it had built-
in cat toys. The day went by, and later on, the conversation 
returned to the jumper. At this point, my mother explained 
that she had bought the item for me because it is like it has 
built in cat toys. All the contextual clues suggested that her 
explanation was sincere, that she’d forgotten that in fact I 
had made the original observation that the garment included 
cat toys, and now, she genuinely took this to be (one of) the 
reason(s) she’d gifted the jumper to me.
One might wonder why she’d do this, but further informa-
tion on the context of our relationship is revealing. We don’t 
have as much to talk about and to regularly touch base on 
as we did in the past, but we’re both real animal lovers, and 
sharing stories about our pets is often a significant part of 
our conversations when we do catch up. The idea of giving 
a jumper with built in cat toys to a person who is known for 
being very fond of their cats captures both of our imagina-
tions, and resonates with us in a way that gifting a jumper 
for warmth only just doesn’t as much.
The explanations put forward by Robin and my mother 
attempt to identify the causes of misfortune or reasons for 
giving respectively (even though neither are sufficiently 
supported by the evidence) and can be thought of as out-
puts of the TFS. Better explanations exist which succeed 
in identifying the relevant causes, although Robin does not 
choose it in the first place, and my mother does not stick to 
it. Why? Gopnik’s account as it is does not have the appro-
priate apparatus to give an answer. I think we have reason 
to extend it as follows: when offering explanations, people 
are not simply motivated to search for causal relations, they 
are also motivated to supply explanations which emphasise 
themes which they find resonant, and which facilitate the 
attainment of social goals, and related psychological func-
tioning, as we’ll now see.
5.3  Why Communicate Resonant Meanings?
There are psychological benefits to the interpretation and 
communication of resonant meanings. Telling meaningful 
stories about our experiences is one way that we construct 
our identity and our sense of ourselves (MacIntyre 1984; 
Schechtman 1996). This can in turn enhance our psycho-
logical wellbeing, increase our resilience, and increase our 
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success in practical achievements. For instance, construct-
ing a personally meaningful story, in which we are the pro-
tagonists, improves our opinion of ourselves, and reduces 
the extent to which we stigmatise ourselves (Corrigan et al. 
2013). Further, as Bortolotti (2018) points out, enhancing 
our sense of self makes us more likely to pursue our goals 
in the face of set-backs, rendering us more productive and 
more effective at problem-solving and planning (Alicke and 
Sedikides 2009; Hepper and Sedikides 2012).
There are also social benefits. Creating and maintaining 
resonant meanings in our conversations about our experi-
ences and the world can actually enhance social interaction. 
Telling meaningful stories about experiences creates and 
strengthens social bonds and group cohesion, increasing 
the sense of community and belonging (Bruner and Feld-
man 1995; Fivush et al. 1995; Reese and Brown 2000; in; 
Kleinknecht and Beike 2004). It also develops shared values, 
which promotes understanding and working with each other, 
increasing the pursuit of shared goals and projects (Engel 
1999; Linde 1993; Reese and Brown 2000).
A number of authors argue that the memory system itself 
is geared towards fulfilment of these psychological and 
social goals. Recall Fivush et al. (1995) claim that auto-
biographical memory develops to assist our recounting of 
our experiences to others, in order to support socialising. 
Conway and colleagues have argued that the information we 
are able to recall about ourselves and our past experiences 
is determined at least in part by particular social and psy-
chological goals that are currently active (e.g. Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce 2000; Conway et al. 2004). More recently, 
Mahr and Csibra (2018) argue that episodic memory evolved 
to support our assertions of epistemic authority in our inter-
pretations of past events, as we communicate our take on 
the past to our peers.
We can now say why this practice of embedding reso-
nant meanings in much of our communication occurs and 
is sustained, as well as how it makes use of Gopnik’s TFS. 
Explanation giving is not just an opportunity to search for 
causal relations, but a chance to stake our claim on a situa-
tion in order to amplify ideas which resonate with us, where 
bringing those ideas to the fore facilitates the attainment of 
psychological or social goals.
Resonant explanations can have positive psychological 
effects. For example, Robin’s preferred explanation, in which 
his experiences aren’t the result of an undesirable lack of 
effort and vigilance, but are part of Aries’ confidence and 
tenaciousness, boosts his sense of purpose and identity. This 
in turn might contribute to better psychological functioning, 
and have knock-on positive effects on socialisation, enabling 
Robin to present himself more confidently, believing that 
there is a deeper meaning to his experiences than simply 
bad luck and lack of effort, when he recounts this explana-
tion to a friend.
Indeed, explanation is often a communicative practice, 
a chance to draw the attention of others to themes, the 
presence of which themselves enhance socialisation, for 
instance, by presenting us in a positive light, and making it 
more likely that our peers will want to continue shared pro-
jects with us; or by providing an opportunity for social bond-
ing. We can think of the explanation given by my mother as 
an example of the latter, the gift of a jumper with apparently 
built in cat toys to a cat person has become a little piece of 
shared history that we refer back to and laugh about when 
we catch up. Martha’s explanation that everyone has already 
had coffee is an example of the former, for it is designed to 
demonstrate to others that, despite being unable to operate 
the coffee pot, she, as the hostess, is nonetheless in control 
of the situation, and is taking care of her guests.
Even though the reasons why Robin and my mother fail to 
provide accurate explanations differ to why Martha fails to,7 
all are motivated to provide an explanation which empha-
sises resonant themes, in order to facilitate the attainment of 
particular social goals, or related psychological functioning. 
So, imbuing explanation with resonance is not just some-
thing that occurs in clinical cases of confabulation, but in 
non-clinical cases, and explanation giving much more gener-
ally. As such, the TFS regularly produces theories which aim 
at emphasising resonant meanings.8
We need to say more about how this fits with Gopnik’s 
evolutionary story about why the TFS functions as it does. 
Recall that for Gopnik, the TFS produces causal theories 
because its doing so confers an adaptive advantage (render-
ing us more successful at navigating and succeeding in our 
physical environment, thus surviving long enough to suc-
cessfully reproduce). There is a strong and a weak hypoth-
esis for integrating resonance into the TFS framework. The 
strong hypothesis holds that in so far as establishing resonant 
7 For Robin and my mother, the information which would enable an 
accurate explanation to be given is not accessed due to a lack of epis-
temic vigilance—it perhaps could be accessed given further reflec-
tion, whilst for Martha, this information is thought to be irretrievable 
due to the progression of her disease.
8 One may wonder what distinguishes this proposal from views ear-
lier discussed, that the memory system itself functions in response to 
social and psychological goals by encoding and retrieving memories 
which facilitate goal attainment (e.g. those of Mahr and Csibra 2018; 
Conway et al. 2004; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000). The proposal 
is that TFS operates downstream of the memory system, drawing on 
the memory system’s outputs when the explanandum is a past event, 
but the TFS also operates when we explain presently unfolding expe-
riences about which there are no memories yet (such as Martha’s con-
fabulation about her present experience of being unable to open the 
coffee; or the participants’ present experience of looking in the mirror 
in Barnier et  al. 2010). The proposal is therefore able to model all 
explanation, whether it is of past or present experience, as a unitary 
phenomenon. I thank an anonymous referee for pushing me to clarify 
this point.
Confabulation, Explanation, and the Pursuit of Resonant Meaning 
1 3
meaning enables us to navigate and succeed in our social 
environment, facilitating successful (survival until) repro-
duction, the production of resonant meanings also confers 
an adaptive advantage. But I will not defend this here. Even 
though we are a highly social species, and less complex 
social aptitudes often confer evolutionary advantages (the 
ability to read expressions, for instance, as in Shariff and 
Tracy 2011), providing meaningful explanations would 
likely be an indirect (and therefore reasonably weak) influ-
ence on the development of the TFS itself.
So, I defend the weaker hypothesis, that the tendency to 
imbue explanations with resonant meanings is not an evo-
lutionarily selected for function of the TFS, but one that is 
maintained through cultural practices that we are inducted 
into in early childhood, which “hijack” the TFS, so to speak. 
Indeed, evidence suggests that the convention of meaningful 
storytelling is learned dialectically, through social-interac-
tion with caregivers (e.g. Engel 1999, Fivush 1995, Nelson 
1996). Further, it has been proposed that children learn that 
telling a meaningful story is supportive of social interac-
tion before they recognise that others expect them to give 
accurate representations of events they have experienced 
(Neisser 1988).
This is compatible with Gopnik’s account, recall that her 
argument is that the TFS evolved because it gives us veridi-
cal information about the causal structure of the world in the 
long run, but it is consistent with this that the TFS regularly 
delivers non-veridical causal maps (2000, p. 315). Gopnik’s 
account as it stands lacks the theoretical apparatus to explain 
why, so often, resonant theories are preferred over veridi-
cal causal ones. This account can, because it highlights that 
explanation is an opportunity to further our psychological 
and social ends, and proposes that whilst the TFS still often 
delivers veridical causal theories, psychological functioning 
and social practices which promote resonant explanations 
have hijacked the TFS, leading to a tendency to produce 
resonant explanations as well as the evolutionarily functional 
outputs, veridical causal ones.
The circumstances in which the explainer finds them-
selves, as well as their present internal motivational states, 
will dictate whether the TFS operates produces a veridi-
cal causal explanation or produces a resonant explanation. 
For instance, a scientist versed in the customs of the disci-
pline, who is highly motivated to provide an accurate model 
of the world, and whose immediate peers share this same 
motivation, may be less inclined to imbue her explanations 
with resonance.9 Conversely, someone seeking to build new 
social networks and to connect with others at a social gath-
ering might be drawn to explanations of their experiences 
which provide an opportunity for bonding, circumstances 
which promote resonance. So, which aim is operative, accu-
racy or resonance, for a particular explanation, depends on 
the individual’s circumstances and other active aims.
Let us turn now to the implications for confabulation.
5.4  Implications for Confabulation and Future 
Research
This account demonstrates that the approaches of (i) Colt-
heart (2017) on which confabulations are the outputs of a 
TFS which governs all explanations (thus modelling con-
fabulation as continuous with everyday explanation giving); 
and (ii) Örulv and Hydén (2006) who stress that confabula-
tions should be understood as attempts to emphasise socially 
important meanings, can be consistent with each other—and 
moreover, that we can preserve the explanatorily powerful 
elements of both views. On my account, it remains true that 
confabulations are continuous with everyday explanation 
giving, and also true that confabulations aim to emphasise 
socially important meanings, because explanation giving in 
general is replete with attempts to emphasise resonant mean-
ings, a practice explained by the social and psychological 
benefits of doing so. This gives us a new interpretation of 
the examples of non-clinical confabulation about consumer 
choices from Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and about policy 
support from Cohen (2003) as discussed in Sect. 2. Par-
ticipants aren’t just giving an explanation which serves as a 
plausible causal theory, they’re giving an explanation which 
identifies personally significant principles which render 
their actions meaningful in the relevant circumstances—as 
humans do in a wide variety of contexts when telling others 
about themselves and the world.
This account paves the way for future research into the 
notion of resonance. One avenue for future investigation 
would be to examine whether using resonant narratives 
enables people to establish meaningful links between 
otherwise disparate items in experience with the effect of 
facilitating information preservation. Recall the Poulson 
et al. (1979) study in which children construct meaningful 
stories when retelling scrambled picture sequences. The 
researchers also found that the material which was recalled 
best was that which was well integrated into the story con-
structed by the child. Other uses of narratives appear to 
have a similar information preserving effect—one might, 
for instance, think of mnemonics as micro-narratives 
which create meaningful connections between otherwise 
disparate pieces of information. It is worth investigating 
whether something similar is going on in each of these 
cases, and whether there is a general, robust effect of infor-
mation preservation through the use of resonant narratives. 
9 We should be careful not to claim that results in science are there-
fore bias and motivation-free. Instead, the thought is that we build 
into our best sciences certain practices which motivate accuracy and 
de-motivate relying on resonance (e.g. use of valid and reliable meas-
ures; a peer-review process, etc.).
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Such an investigation would be worthwhile in itself to fur-
ther understand the significance of resonance. But there 
could also be important consequences for dementia suffer-
ers and dementia care: should it be the case that there are 
information-preserving effects of resonance, then the epis-
temic considerations around confabulation and whether 
confabulated stories should be encouraged become more 
complex. These are of course all preliminary suggestions, 
and are worth exploring in full in future work, as I intend 
to do.
6  Conclusion
We don’t have to choose between Coltheart’s (2017) 
account of confabulation as continuous with everyday 
explanation giving, and Örulv and Hydén’s (2006) account 
that confabulations function to emphasise personally sig-
nificant themes. We can view explanation-giving behav-
iour as both the output of the TFS, and as a means of imbu-
ing our situation with resonant meanings, a tendency that 
developed as a result of the deeply social context in which 
explanations are given, and to facilitate related psychologi-
cal functioning. Being motivated to give resonant explana-
tions means that we are less orientated towards identifying 
underlying causes, and so we should not lose sight of the 
epistemic costs which accompany this tendency. However, 
this tendency confers significant social and psychologi-
cal benefits, and future work should address the extent to 
which information preservation is a robust benefit of the 
tendency to imbue our accounts with resonance.
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